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LINKING INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 
AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 
BUYING SOCIAL JUSTICE: EQUALITY, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, AND 
LEGAL CHANGE. By Christopher McCrudden. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp. Ii, 680. Cloth, $225; paper, $95 . 
Jeffrey L. Dunotf 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S.  government is the planet's largest purchaser of goods and ser­
vices; 1 worldwide, states spend trillions of dollars on procurement each 
year.
2 Yet legal scholarship has devoted relatively limited attention to the 
conceptual and normative issues that arise when states enter the market. 
Should states as purchasers be permitted to "discriminate" to advance social 
objectives-say, racial justice-in ways that would be unlawful when they 
act as regulators? Is each country free to strike its own balance between the 
pursuit of economic and social objectives through procurement, or do inter­
national trade norms limit state discretion in the name of economic 
efficiency? Should states be permitted to use procurement to advance social 
objectives, like environmental protection or worker rights, in other states? 
Government procurement is often viewed as a legal labyrinth of arcane 
tendering procedures, murky supplier qualifications, and obscure challenge 
mechanisms. In Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement, 
and Legal Change ("BSJ"), Christopher McCrudden3 challenges this under­
standing and details how procurement law and policy is profoundly linked 
with the pursuit of social justice. By demonstrating that we can-and 
should-understand procurement as being not simply about the purchase of 
pens and paper clips but also as a potentially powerful vehicle for advancing 
* Nomura Visiting Professor of International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School; 
Professor of Law and Di"rector, Institute for International Law and Public Policy, Temple University 
Beasley School of Law. I am grateful to Sungjoon Cho, Theresa Glennon, Craig Green, Duncan 
Hollis, Andrew Lang, Petros Mavroidis, Mark Rahdert, Robert Reinstein, and Joel Trachtman for 
comments on earlier drafts or for exchanges regarding the arguments presented in this Review. 
Research on this project began when I was a Visiting Senior Research Scholar at the Program in 
Law and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. Support for this research 
was provided by the Clifford Scott Green Chair and Research Fund in Law. 
I .  U.S. SMALL Bus. Am111N. , AN INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINI­
STRATION (SBA) 8 (2007), available at http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba_ 
homepage/serv _abt_overview _english.doc. 
2. 0RG. FOR EcON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
MARKETS 29 (2002) [hereinafter OECD], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/ 14/ 
1 845927.pdf. 
3. Professor of Human Rights Law, University of Oxford; Affiliated Overseas Faculty, the 
University of Michigan Law School. 
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diverse social goals, the book subverts conventional views of procurement 
and identifies new areas of scholarly inquiry and public debate. 
BSJ covers an enormously wide range of topics, including the history of 
the use of procurement for social purposes (Chapters 2--4, 10-14); the theo­
retical arguments for and against the use of procurement policy for social 
ends (Chapter 5);  the trajectory of procurement policy in numerous devel­
oped and developing states (Chapters 6-1 0) ;  the on-again, off-again nature 
of international negotiations over procurement (Chapters 8, 1 1-14); pro­
curement policy's influence on the corporate social responsibility movement 
(Chapter 12) ;  and the international legality of various domestic procurement 
programs (Chapters 1 5-17). As even this highly abbreviated list of topics 
suggests, BSJ is an extraordinarily ambitious text that resists easy summary. 
This Review examines both the details and the rhetorical structure of 
McCrudden's arguments. Specifically, it analyzes some of the issues BSJ 
discusses that are of special interest to international lawyers, including 
particularly the legality of one country using its procurement policy to 
advance social goals abroad (e.g., when several U.S. states passed laws 
designed to address human rights in Burma). In this context, I elaborate on 
McCrudden's analysis in several regards. Specifically, I examine the rules 
that govern the state's ability to pursue social goals as a regulator and as a 
market actor. Does the state have greater freedom when acting in one 
capacity than in the other? Would differential treatment permit states to 
pursue through the back door objectives that they are legally unable to 
pursue through the front door? 
In addition, this Review examines the structure of McCrudden's 
argument. Much of BSJ relies on a problematic distinction between pursuit 
of economic goals and pursuit of social goals through procurement. 
Although the distinction is commonly found in the literature, BSJ itself 
demonstrates that it obscures as much as it reveals .  Moreover, as explained 
more fully below, McCrudden's framing of the issues, mode of analysis, and 
understanding of the relative centrality of formal legal norms shares much 
with two literatures that BSJ straddles-scholarship analyzing government 
procurement law, and writings on the relationship between international 
trade and human rights. However, with its virtually exclusive focus on 
formal legal rules and doctrinal analysis, BSJ is as interesting for what it 
omits-namely, sustained discussion of the empirical effects of international 
procurement policy-as for what it includes. Indeed, while BSJ is ostensibly 
about legal history and legal analysis, the text can also be read as implicitly 
demonstrating the limits of legal analysis and the shortcomings associated 
with approaching social problems exclusively through a legal lens. 
BSJ is a valuable addition to the literature on procurement. Although some 
of its arguments are not fully persuasive, this impressive text invites us to re­
think the relationships between procurement and social justice. To highlight 
some of BSI's most important contributions, this Review proceeds as follows. 
Part I briefly summarizes the economic importance of government procure­
ment, the history of government efforts to use procurement to serve social 
goals, and the move toward international rules in this area. Part II reviews the 
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international norms governing procurement, as well as McCrudden's analysis 
of the legality of one state using procurement policy to address human rights 
conditions in other states. It also addresses an issue that BSJ largely elides: 
given that a state can use various policy instruments to advance the same so­
cial objective, should the law permit states to pursue certain ends through 
procurement but prohibit them from pursuing the same ends through regula­
tion? In this context, I identify some anomalies in current law. Part III 
locates McCrudden's book within the larger debates over trade and human 
rights. It shows that BSJ uses modes of argumentation and conceptual 
frameworks common to this larger literature, and identifies some of the limi­
tations associated with these frameworks. Ironically, however, these 
limitations point the way toward a justification for giving states wide lati­
tude in using procurement to pursue social objectives. 
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
Public procurement-"the purchasing by government from private sec­
tor contractors, usually on the basis of competitive bidding, of goods and 
services that government needs" (p. 3)-is the primary mechanism by which 
public monies are spent.4 The economic impact of procurement is enormous. 
The U.S.  government now spends over $400 billion on procurement each 
year,5 and spending by U.S. states, municipalities, and other subnational 
governmental units, in the aggregate, significantly exceeds federal spend­
ing.6 In 1 998, total procurement (both consumption and investment) for all 
levels of government in industrialized states was estimated to be $4.73 tril­
lion, an amount equivalent to 82.3% of total world merchandise and 
commercial services exports.7 
Given their economic clout, it is not surprising that governments have 
often used their purchasing power as a tool to advance public policy 
objectives. BSJ describes efforts by the United States and European 
countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to use procurement as a 
tool of national industrial policy, including addressing regional disparities 
(pp. 25-3 1) ;  ensuring fair working conditions, such as minimum wage and 
maximum hours (pp. 37-48); and employing both disabled ex-servicemen 
and disabled workers (pp. 56-62). 
These early efforts had transnational dimensions that prefigure many 
contemporary concerns, particularly regarding the ability to impose 
4. For current purposes procurement should be distinguished from state trading, which is 
the commercial activity of state-owned enterprises. 
5. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND Gov'T REFORM, l IOTH CONG., 
MORE DOLLARS, LESS SENSE: WORSENING CONTRACTING TRENDS UNDER THE BusH ADMINISTRA­
TION, at i (Comm. Print 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/features/moredollars/ 
moredollars.pdf. 
6. Procurement by sub-federal bodies was estimated to be $6 1 6  billion in fiscal year 2007 
and $585 billion in fiscal year 2006. Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat: Trade 
Policy Review: United States, 68, WT/TPR/S/200 (May 5, 2008). 
7. OECD, supra note 2, at 7-8. 
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requirements on foreign companies and the economic impact of such 
requirements on domestic firms. For example, in a 1909 legislative debate in 
the United Kingdom over a resolution requiring government contractors to 
pay prevailing wages, a member of Parliament argued that "unless it were 
found possible to impose similar conditions upon foreign competitors, any 
extension of the Fair Wages Clause must inevitably cause hardship amongst 
English contractors and unemployment amongst English working men" 
(p. 5 1 ). This comment foreshadows contemporary concerns that strong 
domestic regulation can disadvantage national firms that compete in 
international markets. 
The early developments reveal another international dynamic that con­
tinues: states' propensities to use procurement policy to favor local 
producers by excluding foreign competition. Since 1 844, the United States 
has had legislation requiring some federal agencies to purchase domestic 
goods (p. 26), a policy currently codified in the Buy American Act 
("BAA").8 This complex federal statute requires, in effect, "that materials, 
supplies, articles, or (since 1 990) services that are acquired for public use 
should be substantially American" (p. 26; footnote omitted). 
McCrudden properly emphasizes the international concerns driving this 
legislation. First, the specific motivation for the 1 933 BAA was the concern 
that a German firm would win a contract for the power plant at the Hoover 
Dam (p. 27). The BAA was also motivated by a general desire to "re­
taliat[ e ]" against discriminatory practices of other states (p. 27). For 
example, since 1920 the British had required that materials used for 
Treasury-financed construction "be of British origin and all manufactured 
articles of British manufacture" (p. 27). Several U.S.  legislators wished to 
respond in kind. Senator Bingham, of Connecticut, summarized the argu­
ment: "There is only one way to meet a perfectly reasonable national 
movement of that kind and that is the so-called 'buy American' movement" 
(p. 27). 
The prominence of international concerns in early procurement debates, 
including concerns over international competitiveness and evidence of "tit 
for tat" exclusionary policies, did not, however, produce international agree­
ment in this area. Indeed, prior to World War II there were virtually no 
multilateral instruments addressing procurement. During the later stages of 
the War, the United States engaged the Allies in discussions over the shape 
of the post-War international economic order. 9 In particular, the United 
States circulated a draft agreement providing that government procurement 
be subject to the same nondiscrimination principles that would govern other 
trade measures. 10 However, the United Kingdom and other states objected to 
8. 41 U.S.C. §§ I Oa-d (2000). 
9. For an authoritative account, see DOUGLAS A. IRWIN ET AL, THE GENESIS OF THE GATI 
(2008). 
10. U.S. Dept. of State, Suggested Chaner for an International Trade Organization of the 
United Nations, U.S. Dept. of State Pub. 2598, Commercial Policy Series 93 ( 1946). 
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these provisions, and they were eventually dropped. 1 1  In their place, a clause 
specifically excluding government procurement from the general nondis­
crimination norms was added. The resulting text became the basis for the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT"). Thus, the GAIT­
which would become the central multilateral instrument governing interna­
tional trade from 1947 through 1 994--explicitly excluded government 
procurement from its nondiscrimination provisions. 
However, by the 1960s, thinking about procurement started to change, 
and a movement toward multilateral rules began. In 196 1 ,  the European 
Community began a long process of limiting discrimination in government 
procurement by adopting two "General Programmes"-in essence, action 
plans-seeking gradually to reduce restrictions on access to government 
contracts (p. 105). Shortly thereafter, a procurement dispute between 
Belgium and the United States arising out of a change to the BAA sparked 
negotiations at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
("OECD") (pp. 1 86-209). The OECD created a working group to explore 
ways of limiting discrimination against foreign suppliers, and by 1967 the 
working group had produced a draft code of conduct. 
These developments paved the way for negotiations at the GAIT that, in 
1979, resulted in an international agreement on rules to liberalize and im­
prove the transparency of procurement. 12 In some ways, this treaty was a 
remarkable accomplishment, as it reversed more than fifty years of trade 
policy and law. Specifically, it provided that each party was prohibited from 
discriminating against other parties in the area of procurement. However, 
coverage was limited in a number of important respects. First, the agreement 
covered only central governments, not subnational governments, and only 
goods, not services. Second, purchases had to be above a certain threshold 
to be covered by the agreement. Third, the agreement did not extend to all 
GATT parties; the treaty's membership consisted almost exclusively of 
OECD states. Finally, the agreement covered only purchases by government 
bodies listed by parties in an Annex to the treaty. The listing of agencies in 
the Annex "was the subject of multilateral negotiations in which states at­
tempted to arrive at a rough balance of procurement value commitments 
offered by each state party" (p. 1 01) .  For example, when the European 
Community did not offer to cover certain entities, the United States with­
drew coverage of, inter alia, the Transportation and Energy Departments, the 
Army Corps of Engineers, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. 13 Thus, al­
though the agreement represented a significant diplomatic development, its 
practical effect was limited. 
1 1 .  P. 98. For the standard history of these negotiations, see Annet Blank & Gabrielle 
Marceau, The History of the Government Procurement Negotiations Since 1945, 5 Pus. PROCURE­
MENT L. REV. 77, 82-83 ( 1996). 
1 2. Agreement on Government Procurement, MTN/NTM/W/21 1/Rev.2, Apr. 12, 1979, 
available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91 990048.pdf. 
1 3 .  See H.R. REP. No. 96-3 17, at 96 (1979). 
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Over time major trading nations, including the United States, sought to 
extend the scope and coverage of this agreement, and, in 1 993, trading states 
entered into a new Government Procurement Agreement ("GPA"). 14 This 
treaty entered into force on January 1 ,  1 996, and substantially extended cov­
erage in several respects. 15 Perhaps most significantly, the GPA covers 
services as well as goods, and it covers subnational as well as central gov­
ernmental authorities. Due to these and other changes, the agreement is 
estimated to cover ten times the value of purchases subject to the earlier 
procurement treaty. 16 In addition, the GPA contains complex rules regarding 
the transparency of domestic procurement systems, including detailed provi­
sions designed to publicize contract opportunities and award procedures, 
limit discretion in competitive procedures, and enable interested parties to 
challenge procurement procedures and decisions. 17 
On the other hand, the GPA is far from comprehensive. Membership is 
very limited: only forty WTO members-the overwhelming majority of 
which are developed states-are party to the agreement. 18 Moreover, cover­
age is still limited to governmental units listed in Annexes to the GPA, i .e., 
parties can exempt certain agencies from GPA coverage. 19 In addition, the 
treaty only applies when procurement exceeds a certain threshold, which 
varies depending upon the type of procurement and the level of government 
making the purchase.2° Finally, states can include "General Notes" in their 
schedules, which provide for additional exceptions (p. 1 02). Notably, several 
states have taken exceptions for procurement programs designed to advance 
social goals. For example, the United States excluded "purchases under 
small or minority-owned business preference programs" and certain "state 
programs promoting the development of distressed areas and businesses 
owned by minorities, disabled veterans, and women" from GPA coverage.2 1  
14. Agreement on  Government Procurement, Apr. 15 ,  1 994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab­
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay 
Round, 33 1.L.M. 1 1 25 ( 1 994) [hereinafter GPA], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf. 
15 .  For extended analysis of the agreement, see SUE ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PRO­
CUREMENT IN THE WTO (2003), and Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Basic Elements 
of the Agreement on Government Procurement, in LAW AND POLICY IN PUBLIC PURCHASING: THE 
WTO AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 1 3  (Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros c. Mav­
roidis eds., 1 997). At the same time, treaties entered into force creating the World Trade 
Organization ("WTO"). In the discussion that follows, I shall use the terms GATT and WTO inter­
changeably. 
16. World Trade Org., General Overview of WTO Work on Government Procurement, http:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/overview_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
1 7. See GPA, supra note 1 4, arts. IX, XIII, XVIl, XX. 
1 8. GPA parties include Canada; the European Communities, including its twenty-seven 
member states; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Israel; Japan; Korea; Liechtenstein; the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands with respect to Aruba; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; and the United States. World 
Trade Org., supra note 1 6. 
1 9. See GPA, supra note 1 4, art. I( l )  & app. I. 
20. See id. art. I(4) & app. I. 
2 1 .  H.R. Doc. No. 1 03-3 1 6, vol. 1 ,  at 1 040 ( 1994). 
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The complexity of the international rules governing procurement is 
compounded by the fact that numerous other international legal instruments 
address procurement-and not always in a consistent manner. Many recent 
bilateral and regional trade agreements contain chapters on government pro­
curement, including, for example, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and every other trade agreement the United States has negotiated 
since 1 994 (p. 223). In addition, various international bodies address pro­
curement outside the context of trade agreements, including the World 
Bank,22 the UN Environment Programme,23 the Inter-American Agency for 
Cooperation and Development, 24 and the UN Commission on International 
Trade Law.25 In addition, the Council of Europe, UN General Assembly, and 
numerous other international bodies work on the closely related fields of 
b .b d 
. 26 n ery an corrupt10n. 
On the one hand, this extensive activity represents a sea change from the 
postwar era, when it proved impossible to develop international rules to dis­
cipline government discretion in this area, including the discretion to 
discriminate against foreigners. On the other hand, as we shall see below, 
the resulting norms are often vague and difficult to discern, and the practical 
effect of this activity is difficult to measure. One of BSJ's central inquiries is 
whether existing rules strike an appropriate balance between procurement's 
diverse goals. Hence, we tum to a more detailed analysis of the international 
norms in this area. 
II. TH E  REGULATION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
We can read BSJ as an extended defense of using procurement as a tool 
for advancing social values. To understand and evaluate BSJ's argument, it 
is useful to distinguish (i) among different types of procurement laws, and 
(ii) between the authority states have when they act as regulators and when 
they act as buyers. As we shall see, states often have more discretion to pur­
sue social objectives as market participants than they do as regulators. 
However, BSJ's failure to offer a persuasive normative rationale for why 
states should have greater discretion as purchasers renders the text more 
22. WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA CREDITS 
(rev. 2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/ 
ProcGuid- 1 0-06-ev I .doc. 
23. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, PLANNING FOR CHANGE: 
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL PROGRAMMES ON SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION 29 
(2008) (encouraging "sustainable procurement"). 
24. See, e.g. , Organization of American States, Annual Report of the Secretry General 2002-
2003 OENSer.D/111.53 (English) (2003), available at http://www.oas.org/SGinfAnual/2003/ 
English/ Annual_Report.pdf. 
25. See, e.g., U.N. Comm'n on Int'I Trade Law , UNCITRAL Model Law on Procuremelll of 
Goods, Construction and Services with Guide to Enactment (June 1 5, 1 994), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement/ml-procure.pdf. 
26. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Brib­
ery and Corruption, 4 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 275 (200 1 ). 
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effective as a descriptive account of state practice than as a prescriptive 
guide for lawmakers or reformers. 
A. Different Strategies in Pursuit of Social Justice 
Much of BSJ turns on the distinction between the state as regulator and 
the state as market participant. In light of this distinction, we can usefully 
distinguish three types of measures: one type explicitly discriminates against 
outsiders (Type I law); a second type "discriminates" to achieve social goals 
within the polity, such as racial equity or environmental protection (Type II 
law); a third type seeks to advance social goals within another jurisdiction 
(Type III law). 
International trade law disfavors measures that facially discriminate 
against foreign goods. GATT Article III provides that imported goods re­
ceive treatment "no less favourable" than "like products of national 
origin"-the so-called national treatment obligation.27 Laws that facially 
discriminate against foreign products are likely to violate this or other WTO 
nondiscrimination provisions. 
As discussed above, the GAIT originally exempted government pro­
curement from the national treatment obligation. Hence, procurement could 
legally be-and often was-used to discriminate overtly against foreign 
producers. However, over time states viewed this carve out for government 
procurement as increasingly problematic, and the national treatment obliga­
tion is at the heart of the GPA. Thus, under contemporary trade law, states 
generally are not permitted to facially discriminate against foreign goods, 
whether the state is acting as a regulator or as a purchaser.28 
International trade law treats Type II measures, such as those that pro­
mote environmental protection, labor conditions, and other domestic social 
objectives, quite differently. With respect to the state as regulator, the GATT 
generally does not address a state's efforts to advance social objectives. 
Rather, the GAIT is centrally concerned that states regulate in a nondis­
criminatory manner; thus, the GATT prohibits states from discriminating 
against "like products" (p. 473). A critical issue is whether products are 
" 'like products' despite the fact that one was produced in a labour rights­
friendly way and the other by means of the most egregious breaches of fun-
27. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III, para. 4, Oct. 30, 1 947, 6 1  Stat. A-1 1 ,  55 
U.N.T.S. 1 94 [hereinafter GATT]. 
28. This is only true, of course, for those WTO members that are parties to the GPA. For 
other WTO members, the operative norm remains that found in GATT Article Ill(8), which excludes 
government procurement from the national treatment obligation. 
It is interesting to compare these rules with dormant commerce clause analysis of state laws 
that facially discriminate against commerce from sister states. Both WTO and U.S. law generally 
prohibit discrimination against outsiders when the state acts as a regulator. However, the regimes 
diverge significantly with respect to the state's ability to discriminate when it is a purchaser. U.S. 
law permits states, as purchasers, to explicitly favor in-state interests over out-of-state interests, see 
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 ( 1 980), while the GPA strictly limits this power. We might ex­
pect precisely the opposite result: since the commitments to a single market and unified polity are 
dramatically stronger in the U.S. context, we might expect that the ability to discriminate against 
outsiders would be greater in the international context. 
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damental labour rights" (p. 473). This question is an instantiation of the 
more general question of whether states can properly distinguish between 
products because of the processes used to produce them. Dispute panels 
have approached this question in different ways,29 and the GAIT-legality of 
process-based trade restrictions is uncertain.30 
But even if a measure violates the national treatment obligation, it may 
fall into one of the GATT's general exceptions. GATT Article XX permits, 
under certain conditions, trade measures necessary to protect public morals; 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; relating to the 
products of prison labor; and relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources (pp. 494-98). To date, no dispute panel has interpreted the 
GATT's "public morals" exception,3 1  and scholars are divided over whether 
it could be successfully invoked to justify measures against foreign products 
produced under conditions that violate labor or human rights.32 Article XX 
provisions on health and natural resources have been interpreted in several 
cases involving environmental issues. For current purposes, it is sufficient to 
note that dispute panels have shown increasing deference to trade-restrictive 
measures that protect human safety and environmental resources. 33 Thus, 
when acting as regulators, states have substantial discretion to advance their 
social agendas-though the precise amount of discretion they possess re­
mains unclear. 
Turning to the governing norms in the procurement context, the GPA in­
cludes a national treatment provision (p. 474). Moreover, even if a measure 
29. A highly controversial GA'IT panel used the product-process distinction to find that a 
process-based U.S. environmental measure violated Article Ill. Panel Report, United States­
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS2 1/R - 39S/1 55 (Sept. 3, 1 99 1 )  (unadopted report); Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global Commons: Can We Pros­
per and Protect?, 49 WASH . & LEE L. REV. 1 407 ( 1 992) (critiquing panel report). McCrudden notes 
that in a more recent dispute, Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS l 35/AB/R (Mar. 12,  200 1) ,  the Appellate Body 
took "an important step away from the doctrine." P. 478. 
30. Article Ill prohibits treatment that is less favorable; the mere fact that like domestic and 
foreign products are treated differently is not sufficient to establish less favorable treatment. Appel­
late Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, para. 1 37, 
WT/DS 16 1 /AB/R & WT/DS 1 69/AB/R (Dec. 1 1 , 2000). Rather a panel must examine "whether a 
measure modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported 
products." Id. If different treatment does not affect the foreign product's competitive opportunities 
then there is no violation of Article m. 
3 1 .  The General Agreement on Trade in Services includes an exception for "measures . . .  to 
protect public morals or to maintain public order." General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 
XIV, Dec. 15 ,  1 993, 33 I.L.M. 44 ( 1 994) [hereinafter GATS] .  A panel found that "the term 'public 
morals' denotes standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or 
nation." Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, para. 6.465, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004). The panel found that U.S. laws de­
signed to counter underage and pathological gambling fel l  within the scope of the GATS exception. 
32. See Steve Chamovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA . J. INT'L L. 689 
( 1 998); Nicolas F. Diebold, The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Tooth­
less 1iger and the Undermining Mole, 1 1  J. INT'L EcoN. L. 43 (2008). 
33. For excellent discussions, see Steve Chamovitz, The WTO's Environmental Progress, 10  
J .  INT'L EcoN. L.  685 (2007), and Henrik Hom & Petros C. Mavroidis, The Permissible Reach of 
National Environmental Policies, 42 J. WORLD ThADE 1 107 (2008). 
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runs afoul of the GPA's national treatment clause, the GPA has an exceptions 
provision that is similar to Article XX in many respects (pp. 49 1-506). 
However, there are at least two other ways that states may have greater 
discretion to pursue social objectives when acting as market participants than 
they do when acting as regulators. First, as noted above, the GPA permits 
states to take detailed exceptions in "general notes" in their schedules 
(p. 102). Several states, including the United States, Canada, Japan, and 
Korea, have exempted from GPA coverage procurement laws aimed at 
promoting small or minority-owned businesses (p. 2 1 8). 
Second, McCrudden offers a strategy for states to use procurement to 
pursue their social goals "lawfully, without having to resort to the excep­
tions provisions" (p. 488). The suggestion, in effect, is to move away from 
statute and regulation and "instead focus on using contract terms" (p. 489). 
Thus, a state might add a contract condition requiring a contract-winning 
firm to use only lumber that was sustainably harvested. McCrudden argues 
that this approach would be consistent with the GPA, which he reads as 
permitting the imposition of any contract term, so long as it is nondiscrimi­
natory (p. 489). This contractual approach invites us to redefine what the 
state is purchasing: a state might wish to purchase not lumber, but lumber 
that is sustainably produced. More broadly, through procurement, the state 
may seek to purchase the public good of social justice. 34 
As discussed in Part III below, McCrudden's advocacy of a contractual 
approach is a key analytic move that opens significant lines of inquiry. 
However, this move-as McCrudden acknowledges-is highly "controver­
sial" as a doctrinal matter (p. 489). It is not clear why a treaty would restrict 
a state's ability to condition procurement on, say, human rights grounds 
through tendering, bidding, and awards procedures, but permit an end-run 
around these provisions through the careful drafting of contract terms. 
Moreover, a norm that encourages states to pursue social goals through im­
position of contract terms rather than through general procurement rules 
would be in serious tension with one of the GPA's central objectives, which 
is to increase transparency in procurement processes. 
Thus far, we have focused on measures designed to promote interests 
within the regulating state. Of greater interest to international lawyers are 
domestic laws that seek to advance social objectives outside their borders, 
which I have labeled Type III laws. Sometimes these laws target a particular 
foreign jurisdiction (e.g., the Massachusetts-Burma law).35 Other times, 
34. Pp. 538-52. For other approaches to using government contracts to promote public val­
ues, see Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 3 1  YALE J. INT'L L. 383 
(2006), and Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 1 1 6 HARV. L. REV. 
1 285 (2003 ). 
35. In 1 996, Massachusetts passed legislation limiting state agencies from buying goods or 
services from firms doing business in or with Burma. In 1998, Japan and the European Community 
("EC") each filed a WTO complaint against the United States, alleging that the law violated the 
GPA. Pp. 292-93. Contemporaneously, a trade association challenged the law in federal court. 
Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a federal statute imposing sanctions on Burma pre­
empted the state statute. Pp. 295-97. As a result, the EC and Japan dropped their complaints, and no 
WTO body ever passed on the legality of the Massachusetts law. 
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measures are directed less at a jurisdiction than at a particular social prob­
lem. For example, a Michigan executive order restricts expenditures of state 
funds in ways that would contribute to the violation of internationally rec­
ognized workers' rights.36 What legal norms should govern situations where 
one state seeks to advance social objectives in other states? Specifically, 
should international law treat these measures more like Type I measures that 
discriminate against outsiders, or more like Type II regulations designed to 
pursue social goals? 
For the most part, the GATT analysis for regulations with extraterritorial 
aims is similar to that set out above for Type II laws, particularly with re­
spect to the GATT's nondiscrimination norms. It is unclear whether Article 
XX could be used to justify a GATT-illegal measure designed to promote 
interests outside the jurisdiction of the regulating state, and the Appellate 
Body has carefully avoided resolution of this issue.37 The uncertainty sur­
rounding whether Article XX is available heightens uncertainty as to 
whether importing states can regulate to protect resources located outside 
their territories. 
However, although BSJ does not discuss it, another regulatory mecha­
nism to promote social objectives abroad is available-at least to some 
states.  A GATT provision known as the Enabling Clause38 authorizes devel­
oped states to extend preferential tariff treatment to goods from developing 
states. Many of the largest trading nations-including the United States, 
Canada, and the European Union-have used this authority to extend pref­
erential tariffs to poorer nations.39 Some of these programs grant an 
additional tariff preference to developing states that have taken specified 
steps to address particular social issues. For example, current EU law pro­
vides additional tariff benefits to developing states that have ratified and 
implemented specific human rights treaties and at least seven of eleven 
listed environmental and "good governance" treaties.40 
The Enabling Clause provides that preferences must be "generalized, non­
reciprocal and non-discriminatory."41 The WTO Appellate Body has found 
that the requirement to extend preferential treatment in a "non-discriminatory" 
36. Mich. Exec. Dir. No. 2004-2 (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.michigan.gov/ 
gov/0, 1 607 ,7- 168-36898_36900-88888--,00.html. 
37. See, e.g. , Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 1 2, 1998). 
38. Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, U4903 (Nov. 28, 1 979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 ( 1980) [herein­
after Enabling Clause]. 
39. See, e.g., UN Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences 
List of Beneficiaries, UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.62/Rev.2 (2006) (listing beneficiaries for each of 
the Generalized System of Preferences programs currently in operation). For a discussion of the 
economics and the politics behind these programs, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Dysfunction, Diversion 
and the Debate over Preferences: (How) Do Preferential Trade Policies Work?, in DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM (Joel P. Trachtman & Chantal Thomas eds., forthcoming 
2009). 
40. Council Regulation 980/2005, 2005 OJ. (L 1 69) I .  
4 1 .  Enabling Clause, supra note 38, at para. 2(a) fn.3. 
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manner does not mandate identical treatment of all developing countries. Ra­
ther, developed states can limit additional preferences only to those 
developing countries that have common "development, financial and trade 
needs."42 Thus, states seem to have substantial discretion to regulate in ways 
designed to promote social conditions abroad. 
The analysis is quite similar for procurement laws designed to promote 
social objectives abroad. Again, states would seem to have broad discretion 
to use procurement for this purpose, subject to GPA's nondiscrimination 
norms. Notably, McCrudden claims that the Massachusetts-Burma law does 
not violate the national treatment obligation. He argues that both foreign and 
domestic suppliers "are treated equally favourably: both are subjected to a 
difference in treatment regarding their engagement in Myanmar" (p. 482). 
Moreover, McCrudden argues that the product-process distinction may not 
be applicable to procurement measures (pp. 48 1-83), which would grant 
states even broader discretion. In addition, states can presumably protect 
Type III procurement laws, like other procurement laws, through exceptions 
in their general notes (pp. 102, 2 1 8). Finally, McCrudden argues that the 
goals of the Massachusetts-Burma law can be achieved through contract 
terms. He specifically suggests adding a contract term prohibiting firms 
from operating in Burma for the duration of the contract (p. 489). As noted 
above, the GPA-consistency of this contractual approach is an open ques­
tion.43 
B .  The Problematic Distinction Between the State as 
Regulator and the State as Market Participant 
This highly abbreviated doctrinal analysis begs a normative analysis of 
whether the rules that limit a state's discretion when it acts as regulator 
should govern the state when it acts as purchaser, and whether the law 
should permit procurement to be used to address social conditions in other 
states. To answer these questions, we would need a theory of the state as 
market participant. Scattered throughout BSJ are hints of what such a theory 
would look like. 
The leading arguments for why the state as purchaser should enjoy wide 
discretion to discriminate to advance social objectives draw a sharp distinc­
tion between the state's role when it acts as regulator and as a market 
participant.44 This approach views regulation-the compelling or forbidding 
of private action through the exercise of raw governmental power-as the 
42. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004). For an analysis and critique 
of the Appellate Body's reasoning in this dispute, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, When-and Why-Do Hard 
Cases Make Bad Law? The GSP Dispute, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 283 (George 
A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007). 
43. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
44. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly invokes this distinction in justifying the 
market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 
U.S. 429 ( 1 980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 ( 1 976). 
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quintessential state action. The state's uniquely coercive powers, including 
powers to imprison, fine, and seize property, justify strong and comprehen­
sive legal constraints on government action. 
In contrast, when the state buys or sells, it exercises no essentially gov­
ernmental powers. Instead, when it enters the marketplace, it is, in effect, 
another private actor. Because the state acts in a very different capacity 
when it buys, it should not be subject to the constraints that apply when it 
regulates. Under this approach, the state should enjoy the same wide free­
doms that private citizens do in choosing from whom to buy.45 
However, there are difficulties with this argument. Many suggest that it 
rests on a distinction between the state as regulator and the state as market 
actor that is largely illusory. As Hersch Lauterpacht observed in a different 
context, even when the state is "ostensibly removed from the normal field of 
its political and administrative activities, the state nevertheless acts as a pub­
lic person for the general purposes of the community as a whole . . . .  [T]he 
state always acts as a public person. It cannot act otherwise."46 
A variation on this critique would suggest that individuals, whether on 
their own or acting collectively through states, often wish to encourage or 
discourage various behaviors through their purchasing decisions. In these 
circumstances, market activity has a self-consciously political dimension. 
That is, as a buyer seeking to advance social objectives, the state embodies 
two components that cannot be fully disaggregated. McCrudden appears to 
be sympathetic to this argument: "When the government makes purchases, it 
acts in the name of its citizens and ought to uphold certain standards" 
(p. 378). 
It is not entirely clear, however, how these critiques-which problema­
tize the distinction between the state as regulator and the state as buyer--cut 
as a doctrinal or a normative matter. If the state acts on behalf of its citizens, 
expresses public values, and seeks to encourage or discourage behavior 
when acting as both regulator and purchaser, then it seems appropriate to 
subject both activities to the same (or similar) legal constraints. Paradoxi­
cally, however, many who insist that the state as buyer is not simply another 
private actor and who view procurement as a way to extend the state's reach 
beyond that permitted through regulation also insist that the state should be 
free to "discriminate" as buyer in various ways that it cannot as regulator. 
Framed in these terms, this debate overlooks other possibilities. For ex­
ample, perhaps the dichotomous debate over whether the state as regulator is 
"like" or "not like" the state as buyer misleads insofar as it masks a contin­
uum. At one end of the continuum are situations where the government is a 
relatively minor player in a large market with many buyers and sellers­
such as when the state buys pencils and paper clips. In these cases, with re­
spect to the relevant market, the government is akin to a private party, and it 
45. This is a primary justification for the so-called market participant exception to the dor­
mant Commerce Clause that states enjoy in the procurement context. 
46. H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 224 ( 1 95 1 ). 
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may be appropriate for the government to enjoy greater discretion than it 
does as regulator.47 At the other end of the continuum are situations where 
the state is a monopsonist buyer, such as when it buys highly specialized 
military equipment. In these circumstances, governmentally imposed condi­
tions on procurement seem functionally analogous to regulation; it follows 
that the constraints on government discretion should be functionally analo­
gous to the constraints the state faces as a regulator. 
Another possibility-which finds ample support in the domestic con­
text-is that grounding doctrine in the conventional distinction between the 
state as regulator and the state as market participant will not generate satis­
factory or coherent results48 because it prompts us to ask the wrong 
questions, thus diverting our attention from more salient inquiries.49 Indeed, 
as described more fully in Part III below, while some of BSJ's arguments 
rely upon a problematic distinction between regulation and procurement, 
one of the text's important virtues is that it helps to highlight limitations of 
the conventional debates, and thus begins to point us toward a more sophis­
ticated theoretical account of government procurement. 
III. PROCUREMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
BSJ stands at the intersection of two debates central to recent WTO law 
and politics: (i) the "linkage" debate, which examines the tensions between 
market liberalization and restrictions on market activity to advance social 
objectives; and (ii) the "procurement" debate, which explores the discretion 
states have in setting their procurement policies, particularly to discriminate 
against outsiders. BSJ is an admirable effort to connect these dialogues; as 
McCrudden explains, "[t]he purpose of this book [is] to provide a bridge 
between these [two debates] , a framework in which such a discussion can 
take place in the specific context of procurement linkages" (p. 576). Given 
BSJ's effort to provide a framework linking these debates, it is appropriate 
to examine the analytic and argumentative framework that McCrudden em­
ploys. 
As explained in more detail below, two aspects of BSJ's framework are 
problematic. First, while parts of BSJ set forth a sophisticated argument that 
subverts the distinction between pursuit of economic and noneconomic 
goals through procurement, much of the book relies on, and hence rein-
47. This is not an argument that the state should be entirely free of restraint. Just because a 
private party in the marketplace can, for example, invidiously discriminate on the basis of race does 
not mean the state should "enjoy" the same power. 
48. Many of the leading efforts to bring coherence to the doctrinal disarray in this area have 
appeared in this journal. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Panicipant Exemption to 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395 ( 1 989); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme 
Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
1 09 1  ( 1986). 
49. Focusing on the traditional distinction effectively asks us to evaluate the relative impor­
tance of a state's proprietary powers as opposed to its regulatory powers. But there seems to be little 
basis for creating a hierarchy of state functions and powers in this way, and BSJ does not attempt to 
do so. 
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scribes and reinforces, this distinction. Second, BSJ rests on questionable 
assumptions about the empirical effect procurement law has on official and 
private behavior. As noted in Part II above, the GPA grants states very wide 
latitude to pursue a broad range of social-justice objectives. BSJ provides 
little evidence that international procurement norms have dissuaded states 
from pursuing social policies, and substantial anecdotal evidence suggests 
that in several respects the GPA's impact has been marginal . Nevertheless, as 
elaborated below, the difficulties in BSJ's arguments point toward an impor­
tant justification for affording states wide latitude in pursuing social goals 
through procurement policy. 
A. The Value of Balancing Trade and Social Values 
BSJ offers a thoughtful analysis of the various dimensions of procure­
ment law. However, this analysis is rendered less persuasive than it might 
otherwise be by deep tensions in the book's treatment of the distinction be­
tween using procurement for economic and for social purposes. Like most 
of the writers in the two debates he straddles, McCrudden locates his analy­
sis within a framework defined by the potential conflicts between pursuit of 
trade or economic objectives, on the one hand, and social objectives, such as 
labor or human rights, on the other. And, as with much linkage scholarship, 
BSJ's goal appears to be striking a balance between these potentially oppos­
ing goals.50 As McCrudden frames the inquiry: "[I]s there a way of 
harnessing . . . the presence of the state in the market for social purposes 
without causing . . .  detriment to the market as the primary means of gener­
ating wealth in society? Can the two be brought into alignment to achieve 
optimum economic, political, and social results?" (p. 1 14). Of course, ar­
ticulating the issue in this way presupposes a strong distinction between 
"trade" and "social" values.5 1  Under this approach, social values such as 
labor rights, human rights, and environmental preservation are by definition 
excluded or external to the trade system; their inclusion requires some form 
of justification or exception.52 
For current purposes, I am less interested in this distinction's descriptive 
accuracy or its problematic doctrinal and political consequences53 than in the 
fact that key parts of BSJ are aimed at subverting this particular conceptualiza­
tion of linkage issues. Consider, for example, McCrudden's extended 
50. Similar balancing imagery is found in much of the linkage literature. See, e.g., Frank J .  
Garcia, The Salmon Case: Evolution of Balancing Mechanisms for Non-Trade Values in WTO, in 
TRADE AND HUMAN HEALTH AND SAFETY 1 33 (George A. Bermann & Petros Mavroidis eds., 
2006). 
5 1 .  See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Re-Characterizing the Social in the Constimtionalization of 
the WTO: A Preliminary Analysis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1 37 (200 1 ); Andrew T.F. Lang, Reflecting 
on 'Linkage ': Cognitive and Institutional Change in the lntemational Trading System, 70 Moo. L. 
REV. 523, 536, 538 (2007). 
52. Lang, supra note 5 1 ,  at 538. 
53. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and": Recent Developments in Trade Policy and Scholar­
ship-And Their Surprising Political Implications, 1 7  Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 759 (1996-97). 
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argument that we should broadly understand the subject matter of procure­
ment contracts as including social objectives (pp. 522-3 1). "If the subject 
matter of the contract can itself be the delivery of the social policy, then social 
issues are no longer 'secondary' to the contract, but central to it . . . .  " 
(p. 524). 
In other words, those parts of BSJ that frame the issue presented as how 
best to balance the competing demands of economic and social values tend 
to reinforce and perpetuate precisely the conceptual framework that other 
parts of BSJ persuasively critique.54 McCrudden's critique suggests that it is 
impossible to separate the "trade" dimension of a procurement contract from 
the "social" dimensions of that contract. And even if this insight leads 
McCrudden to suggest a legal strategy that is, as noted above, doctrinally 
suspect, McCrudden's critique has the considerable conceptual virtue of 
problematizing the conventional distinction between pursuit of "economic" 
and "social" values. Moreover, as discussed in Section IIl.C below, the cri­
tique can be used to help construct an argument for why states should have 
ample discretion to pursue "social" goals through procurement. 
B. BSJ 's Legal Centralism 
Another problematic aspect of BSJ's analysis is its overly sanguine 
treatment of international procurement law's ability to constrain state behav­
ior. As a result, BSJ overemphasizes the role of legal doctrine and 
underanalyzes the empirical effects of international procurement norms. 
Like the literature it straddles, BSJ adopts an approach that we might la­
bel "legal centralism."55 As Andrew Lang and Robert Wolfe suggest, a 
critical dimension of the legal centralist approach as found in trade scholar­
ship is a foundational assumption regarding "the extent to which WTO 
obligations are central . . .  [to] policy-making processes and the degree of 
importance which national policy-makers place upon them in practice."56 
Thus, one of BSJ's central themes is "the role of law" (pp. 16-17), and the 
book purports to devote substantial attention to "the [GPA's] effects, [both] 
direct and indirect" on procurement law across states (p. 301) .  However, 
despite BSJ's richly textured review of procurement developments in various 
countries, the text provides little detail regarding the extent to which WTO 
law influences either the drafting of procurement laws or the application of 
those laws in day-to-day decision making in different states.  
Of course, whether WTO obligations are central or peripheral to deci­
sionmaking depends, in the first instance, on whether relevant governmental 
54. See Lang, supra note 5 1 ,  at 538 (making a similar observation about linkage scholar­
ship); Dunoff, supra note 53 (same). 
55. The term originates in legal pluralist thought and connotes an understanding of law as 
"an exclusive, systematic and unified hierarchical ordering of normative propositions." John Grif­
fiths, What is legal Pluralism?, 24 1. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. I, 3 ( 1 986). 
56. Andrew T.F. Lang, Re-thinking Trade and Human Rights, 15 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
335, 349 (2007); see also Robert Wolfe, See You in Geneva? Legal (Mis)Representarions of rhe 
Trading Sysrem, 1 1  EuR. J. lNT'L REL. 339 (2005). 
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and private actors are knowledgeable about these rules. BSJ provides little 
evidence to suggest either that relevant parties systematically consider the 
relevance of WTO norms or that states systematically undertake GPA com­
pliance review. However, substantial indirect and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many of the relevant actors do not systematically rely upon or 
refer to GPA norms. For example: 
In at least some respects, GPA parties systematically ignore GPA provi­
sions. For example, GPA parties are obliged to collect and provide to 
the WTO on an annual basis various procurement statistics. According 
to the WTO website, as of July 2008, not a single GPA party had sub­
mitted statistics for 2007, only one party submitted statistics for 2006, 
and only two parties submitted statistics for 2005 and 2004.57 
In critical instances, lawmakers are ignorant of the GPA's existence and 
requirements. For example, the key sponsor of the Massachusetts­
Burma law, Representative Byron Rushing, was apparently not even 
aware of WTO rules on procurement when he wrote the bil l :  "I had no 
idea we were party to the Government Procurement blah-blah."58 
There is little evidence that states systematically monitor procurement 
practices in other states or raise issues concerning GPA compliance. For 
example, although WTO dispute settlement is the most active interna­
tional dispute system in history-with over 370 complaints notified to 
the WTO through June 2008, resulting in over J OO adopted panel and 
Appellate Body reports-it appears that only four disputes involved 
procurement issues.59 
The private actors most directly affected by the GPA do not use avail­
able mechanisms to ensure GPA compliance. The GPA requires that 
private parties aggrieved by alleged violations of the treaty have access 
to domestic fora. However, to date, it does not appear that a single case 
alleging a GPA violation has been filed before U.S. courts or adminis­
trative agencies. 
While hardly conclusive, these observations suggest skepticism about one of 
BSJ's fundamental empirical premises-that the GPA importantly affects 
state officials and private parties. Strikingly, in a book that details multiple 
domestic procurement regimes, little attention is devoted to examining the 
influence of GPA norms within international political and legal cultures, 
national regulatory structures, or domestic trading and legal communities­
and what little evidence is presented suggests that the GPA has had "rela­
tively little effect" (p. 222).60 
57. Figures obtained from WTO website. See Statistics Reports under Article XIX:5 of the 
GPA, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpstat_e.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008). 
58. Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty 
Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1 1 27, 1 1 34 n.23 (2000) (quoting Representative Rushing). 
59. See, e.g., WTO Secretariat, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/33 
(June 3, 2008). 
60. Other studies suggest that international efforts to refonn domestic procurement systems 
have met with limited success. See, e.g., OECD/DAC WORLD BANK ROUND TABLE, INTERNATIONAL 
1 056 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 1 07 : 1039 
Moreover, even if policy makers consider GPA norms controlling, these 
norms are highly indeterminate and are qualified by a complex series of ex­
ceptions and exemptions. As Part II above suggests, the GPA and a plethora 
of other international norms may be sufficiently vague and ambiguous that a 
state can pursue virtually any procurement policy it wishes and plausibly 
claim that it is complying with the rules. In these circumstances, we should 
not simply assume that GPA obligations are central to state decisions. 
To be sure, BSJ would not be the first text to overstate international 
law's role in influencing state behavior. And identifying the gap between the 
law and practice does not render legal analysis inconsequential. But it does 
suggest the desirability of reframing traditional debates over international 
procurement rules, many of which are premised on an empirically problem­
atic view of international law's role in this area. 
C. Toward a Theory of Procurement 
Paradoxically, juxtaposing these two aspects of BSJ's argumentative 
structure suggests the outline of a justification for why international law 
should grant states wide latitude to pursue social objectives through pro­
curement, including being able to use procurement to advance social 
objectives in other states. 
As parts of BSJ persuasively argue, it is not conceptually possible to 
completely separate procurement's economic and social effects. Govern­
ment purchases necessarily implicate social concerns: state hiring in 
connection with the building of, say, large public works projects, can either 
ameliorate or exacerbate existing racial or regional patterns of underem­
ployment. In a globalized age marked by highly integrated international 
markets and state purchases totaling trillions of dollars per year, government 
procurement inevitably affects social conditions abroad. It is becoming in­
creasingly clear that the importation of certain goods may help subsidize 
and entrench abusive human rights practices in foreign lands, and the pur­
chase of other products may contribute to unsustainable production practices 
abroad. 
Governments surely have legitimate interests in addressing these social 
effects, either because problematic social conditions abroad generate spill­
over effects that impact domestic interests, or because states have an interest 
in not financially supporting activities that they find morally objectionable. 
Under this latter principle, the Massachusetts law could be understood to 
represent "repulsion by the people of Massachusetts, as represented by the 
legislature, at the prospect of collaborating even indirectly with the notably 
BENCHMARKS AND STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS, para 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35n/2488588.pdf ("(D]evelopment of public procurement systems 
worldwide, that can deliver on the basic principles of a well functioning system, contribute to better 
governance and reduce the opportunity for corruption, has been slow"); see also Robert R. Hunja, 
Obstacles to Public Procurement Refonn in Developing Countries, in PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: THE 
CONTINUING REVOLUTION 13 (Sue Arrowsmith & Martin Trybus eds., 2003). 
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tyrannical regime that currently controls Burma."61  Moreover, to the extent 
Type Ill laws are genuinely motivated by and aimed at social conditions 
abroad, they do not reflect the local protectionism that violates the GPA's 
national treatment obligation. 
One objection to this line of argument is that procurement is an ineffi­
cient mechanism for promoting social justice; most economic analysis 
suggests that "[d]irect legislation . . .  and not the use of indirect financial 
incentives or sanctions that have unacceptable or unpredictable distorting 
effects, are seen as the best way of enforcing required norms without unac­
ceptable side-effects" (p. 1 19). Moreover, procurement might also be seen as 
an ineffective policy tool as procurement laws may be largely ineffective 
outside of those areas of economic activity that are particularly dependent 
upon government contracts (p. 1 19). 
Note, however, that these objections implicitly assume the relative supe­
riority of prescriptive regulation over procurement as a tool for constraining 
or changing behavior. But this assumption may overstate the effectiveness of 
traditional regulation, which typically is less than entirely successful in 
achieving its goals and often produces unwanted and unintended conse­
quences. We've seen above some of the ways that many states fail to comply 
with "regulatory" treaties such as the GPA.  In addition, highly visible do­
mestic experience suggests that regulations and litigation aimed at 
promoting the types of social goals advanced through procurement laws 
often enjoy only limited success, and that the government's power of the 
purse is at times the most effective way of advancing certain social goals.62 
From a scholarly perspective, McCrudden's analysis points toward a fu­
ture research agenda involving a detailed consideration of the relative 
efficacy of procurement and regulation. Without investigating the relative 
success of procurement and regulation as alternative mechanisms, it is im­
possible to sensibly answer the larger questions that BSJ raises about the 
appropriate use of procurement policy to advance social ends. To be sure, 
such a comparative inquiry is difficult and, at best, likely to yield recom­
mendations that are contingent and qualified. Yet without engaging in this 
form of comparative analysis, it is difficult to generate meaningful empiri­
cal, doctrinal, or normative claims about the appropriate scope and details of 
procurement law. Moreover, whatever level of success regulation has in 
promoting social objectives domestically, such laws will invariably have less 
success at modifying conditions abroad. Hence, the inadequacy of other 
forms of regulatory tools-the limits of the law--offers an additional justi­
fication for using procurement to advance social ends. 
6 1 .  Sanford Levinson, Compelling Collaboration with Evil? A Comment on Crosby v. 
National Foreign Trade Council, 69 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2 1 89, 2 1 9 1  (2001 )  (analogizing the Supreme 
Court's decision striking down the Massachusetts law to Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 4 1  U.S. ( 1 6  Pet.) 
539 ( 1 842)). 
62. GARY 0RFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS: CHANGING 
PATTERNS OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1 968 ( 1 993) (detailing Southern resistance to 
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CONCLUSION 
BSJ's singular achievement is to highlight how the state's power of the 
purse is-and should be-used to promote social values. The book provides 
an impressive review of procurement developments in multiple jurisdictions, 
and Christopher McCrudden deserves praise for the breadth of his research, 
the care with which he develops his arguments, and the analytical rigor of 
his claims. 
Today, international procurement law is not high on the diplomatic 
agenda. But this could quickly change. A legal challenge to a South African 
law designed to promote black economic empowerment is currently pend­
ing.63 Should this dispute, or another, produce a ruling where international 
norms threaten procurement laws designed to promote social objectives, 
procurement will move quickly to the center of the international legal and 
political stage. If and when this occurs, Buying Social Justice will provide a 
thoughtful and thorough guide to the issues that will need to be addressed. 
63. Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, No. ARB/(Af)/07/1 (ICSID (W. Bank) regis­
tered Jan. 8, 2007). Status updates on the case are available on the ICSID website. International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Pending Cases, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (last visited Jan. 5, 
2009). 
